KSI 학술 논문 정보 == 국내 모든 논문,학술논문,학회논문,연구논문,학

KSI 학술 논문 정보 == 국내 모든 논문,학술논문,학회논문,연구논문,학

Chalmers and Extended Mind

There seems to be a possible disanalogy in Professor David Chalmers' paper("Extended Mind", Issues in the Philosophy of Mind, The 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, 2008), a disanalogy between stories of Eileen and Otto. One may ask them by saying "are you sure that the museum is on the 52nd street?" Eileen may promptly respond to the question by answering "yes, I am sure of my belief because I checked it yesterday". But Otto may take a few seconds of time to ponder how to formulate his position in connection to the question. Being a considerate man and/or being handicapped of memory trouble, Otto would say "If my notebook is reliable I may be certain of my belief to that extent".

The disanalogy between the two appears to be this: Whereas Eileen herself is authoritative as to what she believes, Otto ascribes the authority of his belief to his notebook. Anybody can question Otto by asking how he can appeal to the authority of a written text?

One of the further implications of this disanalogy is that Eileen and the questioner may come to share some personal relationship whereas Otto and the questioner are limited to having an informational relationship.

Stanley and Quine

The attempt in Professor Jason Stanley's paper("Referential Semantics", Issues in the Philosophy of Language, The 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, 2008) to construct a functional formalism structure out of the notion of degree in 3.2 children looks successful. I would believe that anybody can agree that the expression "3.2 children" in a sentence "An average American family has 3.2 children" may be taken to refer to this structural entity. But not only everyday people on the street but also philosophers in this seminar of the philosophy of language may have used expressions of a kind like "3.2 children" long before any functional structure was there suggested.

My question is this. Is semantics descriptive or prescriptive? If it is prescriptive what would its purpose or value be? Is it to be computational or to be ontological of a particular kind like physicalism? If it is descriptive, is it to be descriptive of speaker's language use or of speaker's state of mind when he utters the sentence?

Suppose that Professor Alvin Plantinger constructed a formal function for the word "god" in his system. Would there be a difference between ways to construct a formal functional entity, Quinean and Stanlean?

Gendler and Nonratioanlity of Alief

One can grant in Professor Tamar Gendler's "Alief and Belief"(Issues in Epistemology, The 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, 2008) that the architect of the Grand Canyon Observatory Glass Bridge may believe to be safe walking on the bridge and yet has an alief of trembling sensation.

But suppose that there is the knowledge of the perfect architectural safety for the bridge which consists of propositions p1~pn. Wouldn't it be the case that the more number of propositions p1~pn is somehow known to her in building the bridge to be increasing the less trembling sensation of her alief may take place? If this conjecture is plausible would he still be justified in believing that alief is neither rational nor irratioal?

Yamamoto on Friendship

Prof. Yoshihisa Yamamoto's paper on friendship('Thomas Aquinas on the Ontology of Friendship: Selfness and Otherness', The 22nd World Congress of Philosophy, Seoul, 2008) is rich in its metaphysical implications and full of insights. My reading of it was one of the opportunities of joy where I can experience of philosophizing.

As I read it, the basic structure of the paper may be summarized in the following 5 propositions. I took the last paragraph of the paper to mean the conclusion (5) and premises (1)~(4) may allow interpretations by which one can derive the conclusion.

1. A man is 'undivided in itself(unum)', holding his own uniqueness.
2. He is 'distinct from others(aliquid)',
negating something he can share with others.
3. Whatever exists is active(Thomistic ontology),
then the world is the organic totality of interactions among what there are.
4. Anything good is self-diffusive(Neoplatonic principle).
5. Friendship is a relationship
(5.1) among two independent individuals(1 & 2);
(5.2) of mutual betterment(3 & 4).

If this understanding of the paper is plausible, the notions of God, cause, finitude, and love which were introduced in the paper may not be necessary for the argument, while they may help some readers to understand the arguments.

I remember the conversations which Professors Yamamoto, Taesoo Lee and I shared at the Congress Dinner. Some of the questions raised at the time still linger in my mind. Is the notion of friendship (5) acceptable and persuasive? Even though it has a merit of allowing and/or requiring a universal friendship, aren't human beings finite in their resources in their emotion, time, and economy? If we take 'friendship' to mean a relationship among persons who love to share what they consider precious or pleasant, aren't this is too restricted and yet ordinary? Which is more beneficial and/or strategic for human kind, Aquinasian friendship or an ordinary one?

Intentionality of Cheng(誠): Toward an Organic View

Table of Contents

[1] Intentionality Principle, Divisional or Organic?
[2] A Conception of Cheng(誠)
[3] The Failings of the Physicalistic World View
[4] An Informational View of the World Holistic
Bibliography
Notes


[1] Intentionality Principle, Divisional or Organic?

The notion of intentionality[1] has been in the center of the debate
between dualism and physicalism quite some time. Dualism insists that
intentionality is the mark of mental phenomena which separates humans
from other animals whereas physicalism roughly claims that whatever there
is either reducible to some physical states or explainable in terms of some
physical language.

Which is more plausible? Physicalism, on the one hand, is
attractive as a philosophical world view but it raises more philosophical
problems than it solves. On the other hand, dualism is useful in explaining
much of human mental life but is not effective enough in explaining what is
to be an acceptable relationship between mind and matter.

Is there any other alternative? Where can we look for one? We
know that Asian tradition is full of organic world views. I am inclined to
think that one alternative world view may come from this background. This
paper tries to show that the notion of cheng(誠) intentionality is such a
candidate.

I will advance a thesis in this paper that cheng(誠) intentionality is
holistic. The notion is not only applicable to humans but also to other
phenomena. This may seem indistinguishable from physicalism in its
monistic settings. Since I believe that the notion of cheng(誠) is more
persuasive in explaining mental phenomena in evolutionary terms, I would
argue here that the thesis can also be supported by some notions like
that an information is a syntactical structure which reflects physical states
and that the physicalisitic view of the world is not sufficient.


[2] A Conception of Cheng(誠)

'Cheng(誠)' means moderation, rectitude, propriety, equilibrium,
lack of prejudice, objectivity, honesty, sincerity, devotion,
truthfulness, true heart; being respectful, honoring, making it true, being
careful about one's words. On the surface, the word seems to mean
many different things. But this impression may be weakened if one takes a
look at the root of the word. Cheng(誠) consists of two components,
yan(言) and chheng(成). ‘Yan(言)’ literally means language, metaphoric
principle or objective, whereas 'chheng(成)' connotes fulfillment, realization,
or arrival. Yet the notion of cheng(誠) remains a complex one as many
important notions are. I would like to offer 5 propositions in order to arrive
at an interpretation of cheng(誠) that I hope will render the notion more
clear, coherent, and illuminating.

The notion of cheng(誠) is certainly one of some key concepts in
Confucianism as one can see when Tzu Ssu regarded it as the central
theme of Confucian thought. It was highlighted in The Doctrine of the
Mean(中庸, Zhong yong),[2] one of four Confucian texts. Some scholars
interpreted 'cheng(誠)' anthropologically[3], limiting the notion exclusively to
that of devotion, sincerity, existential human being.

But my reading of the text points to a different direction. Two of
many texts which can support my reading are: "cheng(誠) is the way of
heaven whereas the practice of cheng(誠) is the way of the human(誠者
天之道也, 誠之者 人之道也)"; "cheng(誠) is the first and the last of all
things; if there is no cheng(誠) then there is nothing(誠者 物之終始, 不誠
無物)". Then the notion of cheng(誠) can be translated from the text
inclusively[4] as a notion of integration.[5] The following statement is what
we can arrive at by summing up those ideas in terms of integration:

2.1 The cheng(誠) of an entity is the power to realize the embedded
objective of it in the context where it interacts with all others.

What is integration? It may be seen from a third person point of
view, taking it to mean 'harmonizing' of two or more others and this is
sometimes called 'syncretism'. But I would, in this context, suggest that
integration is one's own bringing of elements of other systems together
into one's own body or system. The exegesis of the word ‘integration'
from the first person point of view may be seen as 'adjustment' or
'growing'. Integration is not an activity of some third party but that of the
one who attempts it himself. What one may call an "integrator" is
everywhere and all things in the world are integrators which
process informations given by their surroundings. The Cartesian tradition
used to call this integrator "mind" by limiting the scope of its function to
only humans, but the Confucian tradition(性卽理) calls "mind" any agent
that does integrate. This is another element of the notion of cheng(誠)
which can be expressed in the following statement:

2.2 'Mind' refers to the ability of not a single kind of entity but to that of
all entities of complex degrees in processing information.

The difference between the two traditions is obvious. Cartesian
scholars think that they can see the distinction between thought and
matter. It is possible, they thought, to think that humans can exist without
body but impossible to think that humans can exist without thinking. The
body is contingent on the human but thought is not. They apply this logic
to other things to conclude that the human is a thinking being but other,
non-human things are not. Dualism is thought to obtain thereby. But the
Cartesian modal argument is flawed in that it is only in the actual world that
an embodied person thinks. Is there any criterion of identity to distinguish
persons without bodies who thinks? Confucian students entertain an
organic view of the world, holding a thesis of continuity between human
and all other things.

2.3 cheng(誠) is a power of mind not only of human but also of all other things.
The continuity thesis is strengthened when evolution theory is
presented as an option for the explanation of the origin of species.
Suppose that the theory is taken as a hypothesis. Then, one is forced to
accept not only the evolution of our bodies but also that of our minds. We
are in a position to see that human history is continuous with the histories
of other entities.

2.4 If evolution reflects a history of species of what is better fit
then history represents an evolution of life forms of what is intelligent and just.

The evolution theory is apparently an optimistic one. This is
perhaps because it was developed from the view point of the survivors of
that processes. Certainly, there have been struggles and pains in the
processes of evolution. But the wholesome results of the evolutionary
processes in nature is such that survivors have become organically related
with each other. When we come to see nature from this perspective, we
can't help but perceive an eventual harmony in it, perhaps a cosmic
harmony. The notion of cheng(誠) expresses such an internalistic
optimism:

2.5 Cheng(誠) is realizing what can be the best in a given situation
in which a subject is involved with its surroundings at the time.[6]


[3] The Failings of the Physicalistic World View

I want to argue that Cheng(誠) intentionality may allow a basis
upon which to build an organic view of the world and, at the same time, to
replace the physicalistic point of view. Why do we need to reconsider
physicalism? There are several reasons.

Physicalism requires many notions to survive as a system:
reduction, supervenience, the closure principle, and causation, among
others. But these notions assume that there are at least two kinds of
language, mental and physical. For example, in order to reduce a mental
concept to a physical one, there must be some parallel, if not isomorphic,
structure between the mental language and the physical language. If one
has to allow such a structure then isn't so-called "phyicalism" a disguised
form of dualism? If reduction is real in one direction so must it be in the
other. If reduction is to be real, first the reducer and the reduced must be
real as well.

Physicalism assumes that there is one clear language which is
physical. For an example, many physicalists employ the notion of cause as
one standard whether a certain description is physical or not. If an event is
describable in terms of causation it is regarded as a physical event.[7] In
other words, if an event under a certain description can enter into some
causal relations with other events, then that description of the event counts
as physical.

But this criterion is problematic. For it is impossible to dictate
one causal description to any event or any object. For any description in a
final analysis is an interpretation. For an example, Brutus' killing Caesar
and Brutus' stabbing Caesar may be taken as one and the same physical
event but are given to us under two different psychological descriptions.
To explain why Brutus killed caesar may not be the same as to explain why
Brutus stabbed Caesar.[8] Likewise, as it is well discussed, my turning on
the light and my alerting a thief may be counted as the same physical
event. But my turning on the light causes the room to be illuminated but my
alerting a thief does not.

If there is not a single condition for an entity to satisfy in order to
be physical, could the physicalism be stated in a physical language? If a
physical language is not obtainable what could one think the physicalism is
like?

Suppose that physicalism is granted. One question among many is
concerned with the relation of logic and nature. Is a rock purely an
aggregate of material elements? How is the rock different from a rose
which should be another aggregate of material elements? One is naturally
inclined to admit that rocks and roses are constituted differently. But
exactly what is the difference between the two consittutions? When they
expand, contract, or grow aren't they in a type of informational states?

One further question is what is the structure of these informational
states which make rocks and roses different. Shouldn't we allow that they
are programmed differently, that they possess a different logic? Then, are
the programs and logic of these things physical or mental? Is a phyisicalist
prepared to say that they are material? This discussion on the relationship
of the two will continue in the next section.

Physicalism faces another challenge. It can be stated as follows: if
the body is a product of evolution, so must be the mind. One may be
tempted to deny the consequent in the conditional. Then how could he or
she remain intact without having to deny the antecedent? Of course there
is one option for the physicalist. It is to deny the reality of the mental. Is
there any other possibility?


[4] An Informational View of the World Holistic

There seems to be two versions of the informational view of the
world. One is that everything humans see and experience is a text to be
interpreted. This may be called "an epistemic version" which has been
developed from the Kantian transcendental theory of knowledge. The other
is that anything which exists in the world, whether it be sand, a plant, or a
bird, constitutes a system which interacts informationally with systems of
other things.[9] A stone or a flower receives a variety of appropriate in-put
from its surroundings and gives relevant out-put. This is "a processing
version" which I would like to focus on. For I came to believe that this
version allows a clear explanation of the continuity of humans and all other
things in the world.

F. Dretske ignores the ultimate difference between representations,
both artificial and natural. The former can be reduced to the latter which,
he thinks, is basic. He is ceratin that human mental content is thus
explained in his naturalistic terms. This representation results from its
dependence relationship[10] with the state of affairs in which it is found. Then
this natural representaion will be seen in human physiology, which is what
he calls a 'proto-belief'. His dependence relationship is eventually found to
be informational.

R.G. Millikan's strategy is evolutionary rather than causalistic.[11]
She thinks that proper functions and their teleology of biological beings
have been determined. That is, when we humans think in the way we do
what is involved in that thinking processes is determined evolutionarily
rather than in some mysterious way. For her, procedures to use
representations are the same as ways to represent and to determine the
representational contents.

D.J. Chalmers[12] goes further than Dretske by suggesting some
form of pan-psychism. Here rocks don't have a system of information
processing and thus have neither consciousness nor experience. But when
rocks are inflated or deflated they are in informational states which include
a system of quasi-consciousness. These may not be phenomenal qualia
but some proto-phenomenal qualia.

These three philosophers[13] have distinct ways of formulating their
own naturalism as to mental content. Their versions of naturalsim are not
fully worked out yet as has been pointed out.[14] But they seem to share the
belief that human intentionality is not a basis by which one can show that
human is essentially different from all other animals. To varying degrees,
I would believe, they are evolutionary, weakly or strongly, in explaining the
issue of human intentionality.

The evolutionary thesis may be criticized in that it is optimistic. For
it appears that human species are placed at the apex of the evolutionary
process. To my mind the appearance is not mistaken. For evolution and
devolution are not some physiological states which are independent of
description. They are rather described from the perspective of the survivors
of evolution. The notion of evolution may not carry with it the explicit thesis
that what has survived is for the better but the implicit thesis that those
which have survived are the fitter.[15]

Bibliography

Chalmers, David J., The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental
Theory, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
Chung, Daihyun, Embodied Mental Content, Seoul: Acanet, 2001(In Korean).
Confucius(孔子), Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the
Mean(論語 Lun yu, 大學 Da xue, 中庸 Zhong yong, ), tr. James
Legge, Dover, 1971, Clarendon, 1893.
Davidson, Donald, "Causal Relations", 149-162; "Mental Events", 207-224;
both in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980.
Dretske, Fred, Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes, MIIT Press, 1988.
Lee, Gyusung, "Sincerety", Wang Sungsan's Philosophy of Becoming,
Ewha Womans University Press, 2002(In Korean).
Lee, Kangsoo, "Philosophy of Human in Zhong yong", Understanding of
Ancient Chines Philosophy, Seoul: Jisiksanupsa, 2003(In Korean).
Lee, Sangun, Life and Learning of Togegye, Seoul: Somoondang, 1973(In Korean).
Lee, Seungchong. "Intentionality and Method(In Korean)", Philosophical
Issues in Korea, ed., Korean Philosophical Association, Seoul:
Chulhakgwa Hyunsilsa, 2000.
Legge, James, "Translator's Introduction" in Confucius, Analects, The
Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean, Dover, 1971, Clarendon, 1893.
Kim, Jaegwon, "On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory", American
Philosophical Quarterly, 3(1966).
Millikan, Ruth Garrett, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice,
MIT Press, 1993.
Park, Jonghong, "Thoughts of Zhong yong", Complete Works of Jonghong
Park, Vol. 3, Hyungsul Pub. Co., 1982.
Searle, John & John Perry, "Intentionality", A Companion to the
Philosophy of Mind, ed., S. Guttenplan, Blackwell, 1994.
Shannon, C. E., "A Mathematical Theory of Communication", Bell Systems
Technical Journal, Volume 27(1948).7-85.
Yoon, Bosuk, "Intentionality and Naturalism(In Korean)", Philosophical
Naturalism, ed., Korean Society of Analytic Philosophy, Seoul:
Chulhakgwa Hyunsilsa, 1995.
Yoon, Sa-soon, "Modern Value of the Confucianist Ideal in 'Realizing Self
and Realizing Others(成己成物)'", Study of Confucian Thoughts,
Volume 26(2006): 5-19(In Korean).


Notes

[1] For contemporary discussions of the notion, see John Searle & John Perry, "Intentionality", A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, ed., S. Guttenplan(Blackwell, 1994), 379-386, 386-395; Seungchong Lee, "Intentionality and Method(In Korean)", Philosophical Issues in Korea, ed., Korean Philosophical Association(Seoul: Chulhakgwa Hyunsilsa, 2000).
[2]Confucius(孔子), Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean(論語 Lun yu, 大學 Da xue, 中庸 Zhong yong, ), tr. James Legge(1815-1897, Dover, 1971, Clarendon, 1893).
[3]James Legge(1971), Jonghong Park(1980), "Thoughts of Zhong yong", Complete Works of Jonghong Park, Vol. 3, 612, 620, 608-20(In Korean); Sangun Lee, Life and Learning of Togegye(Seoul: Somoondang, 1973, In Korean).
[4] 4) Sa-soon Yoon(2006), "Modern Value of the Confucianist Ideal in 'Realizing Self and Realizing Others(成己成物)'", Study of Confucian Thoughts, Volume 26(2006): 5-19(In Korean); Kangsoo Lee(2003), "Philosophy of Human in Zhong yong", Understanding of Ancient Chines Philosophy(Seoul: Jisiksanupsa, 2003), 103-111(In Korean); Gyusung Lee(2001), "Sincerety", Wang Sungsan's Philosophy of Becoming( Ewha Womans University Press, 2002, In Korean), 240-243.
[5] 5) Professor Kwangse Lee of Kent State University suggested the translation in a conversation years ago.
[6] The notion of Cheng(誠) does not exclude elements of conflicts. It rather requires the process of sharp complains or great earthquakes if necessary before it eventually arrives at the stage of peace or harmony.
[7]Donald Davidson, "Causal Relations", 149-162; "Mental Events", 207-224; both in Essays on Actions and Events(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
[8]Jaegwon Kim, "On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory", American Philosophical Quarterly, 3(1966): 277-85.
[9]C. E. Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of Communication", Bell Systems Technical Journal, Volume 27(1948).
[10]The dependence relation between representation and states of affiars is not the relation between tokens c and f, but between types C and F. Then, an occurrence of token c indicates a token f but this token indication is not necessary. And the context may affect the indication relation and misrepresentation is allowed. Fred Dretske, Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes( MIIT Press, 1988).
[11]Ruth Garrett Millikan, White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice(MIIT Press, 1993).
[12]David J. Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory( New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
[13]Daihyun Chung, Embodied Mental Content(Seoul: Acanet, 2001, In Korean), 169-240.
[14]Bosuk Yoon, "Intentionality and Naturalism(In Korean)", Philosophical Naturalism, ed., Korean Society of Analytic Philosopy(Seoul: Chulhakgwa Hyunsilsa, 1995), 203-214.
[15]A draft of this paper was read at the Seoul Conference of Asian Philosophy , organized by Korean Philosophical Association, June 1-2, 2007 at Sungkyunkwan University, Seoul, South Korea, and this is to be published in 2008 at Philosophy and Culture: Metaphysics, Korean Philosophical Association.

*Daihyun Chung, “Intentionality of Cheng(誠): Toward an Organic View”, Philosophy and Culture: Volume 2 Metaphysics, Korean Philosophical Association, 2007: 33-40.

The Changing Nature of Knowledge and New Directions for the Humanities

Table of Contents

(I) Expansion of the Notion of Knowledge
(II) Predicaments of Human Conditions and New Directions for the Humanities
(III) The Humanities: Gap Between Universities and Cultural Realities
(IV) Verbal Languages and Digital Languages in the Humanities


Paik Nam-june created an art piece called "Descartes" (Picture 1) which is exhibited at the National Museum of Contemporary Art in Gwachun, a town adjacent to Seoul. The work seems to say "My brain processes digitally therefore I am". Paik represents the Descartes of Rationalist Dualism as a robot of Physicalist Digitalism. As Paik's digital processes threaten to replace Descartes' mental processes, one comes to wonder how long the human mind will be considered as an essential part of human existence. Whereas Descartes philosophized the long-held dualist tradition of the West through his rationalist language, Paik led attempts in the art world to show the ubiquity and plasticity of digital languages through a series of his video art works. Here I will focus on how the monistic epistemology of logocentrism gives way to pluralistic epistemologies and explore the implications this change might have for new directions in the humanities.

(I) Expansion of the Notion of Knowledge

Many of us are familiar with Plato's Cave metaphor or the Biblical saying that "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free". Both of these seem to presuppose a special notion of knowledge, namely, what may be called "knowledge as the mirror of the reality". This view is saying that what we experience in this world are mere phenomena and that genuine reality lies outside the world of experience. What proceeds from these phenomena are doxastic opinions, which will lead us into never ending debate and confusion. However, if only we could reach true reality it will grant us one wholistic system of knowledge, which would unite the entire human race and set us all free at last. Western traditions suggest two routes leading to this reality: reason and religion. But intellectual communities under the influence of Descartes preferred the former to the latter, apparently believing that reason will take us from manifold and mutable appearances of the world to the simple reality governed by the transparent logical order.

If we can name this view "a realistic theory of knowledge", I believe a contemporary version of the theory is known as the model of "knowledge as justified true belief". It is believed that a true belief can be transformed into knowledge by means of reason, evidence, or justification. The notion of reason as the bridge connecting the phenomenal world and the real world became the notion of reason as a device to show the connection of a certain belief and its truth. This instrumental reason is again replaced by empirical notions like evidence or contextual notions like justification. The celestial realism becomes a terrestrial realism. While knowledge requires a belief to be true, the notion of the truth can't help but be the unilateral and singular notion of truth of reality. If one can accept the truth realism of knowledge, the justified true belief will constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge.

The realism tradition of knowledge faces two challenges, the Gettier counter examples and some research in semantics. The Gettier examples show that one can satisfy the necessary and sufficient conditions for having knowledge as required by classical epistemology without reaching knowledge. The Gettier problem triggers various attempts to overcome the counter examples to maintain the formal conditions for knowledge. Notions like evidence, inference, and causality have been investigated and theories like reliabilism, evidentialism, foundtionalism, and coherentism were examined. But those attempts appear to be overshadowed by current research in semantics.

If Descartes turned the age of metaphysics into that of epistemology, then Frege-Wittgenstein seemed to change the generations of epistemology into those of the philosophy of language, at least for a while. Philosophers in language raised many issues in epistemology though not directly. Justified true beliefs cannot be expressed without using sentences. But what is a sentence? Suppose that a sentence can obtain its meaning by an ordered pair of two sets of conditions, namely, the one which consists of conditions where the sentence can be true and one where it is false. Then, the meaning of the sentence can be understood in terms of the sort of realism mentioned above and there wouldn't be a problem. But the concept of truth becomes problematic. While the truth of a sentence cannot be presented independently of the sentence, the meaning of the sentence should be given by the conditions of the truth of the sentence. Wittgenstein fills the vacuum, left behind by the notion of truth, by the notion of the forms of life that members of a linguistic community are engaged in.1)

The distinction between truth semantics and communal semantics suggests another distinction, namely, that between theory and discourse. When meaning of a language is to be successfully given in terms of the truth theory, there will be the one true theory in the final analysis which will explain any problem. The truth semantics justifies the notion of theory. But if we may suppose that the communal theory of meaning is plausible, then there is not much to constrain us toward the one single theory of all. Rather, we are likely to have various communal discourses on any special issue in the concrete contexts of our lives. For example, information would be one illustration of pluralistic epistemologies. One may take an understanding of the notion of information as a syntactical structure rather than as a true sentence. The former and not the latter allows anything to be information which is digitally processed. Computers make it possible that we can access not only to verbal languages but also to sounds and pictures if they could be rendered syntactically. Now movies and music can be reached anywhere if they satisfy that syntactical requirement.

Human languages have evolved in accordance with the gradual growth of the forms(plural) of life of human kinds.2) Though there are various forms of life in human communities, human species as a natural kind share some important form(singular) of life, by which they can translate one language to another. If we are to prefer the community based discourse to the truth based theory, the epistemology we should choose may be some sort of discourse which our communal interests dictate that we pursue. The activities of the discourse are bound to be dialectical or pluralistic. The discourse will be inclusive of the questions of intellectual lives, communal advancements, and completions of individuals.

(II) Predicaments of Human Conditions and New Directions for the Humanities

What are the humanities? There are many ways to formulate the notion of the humanities. One of them would be that humanities are basically a teleological anthropology in the sense that they are attempts to humanize the world, in which people or individuals live and of which they are part. Humanization itself is open to various interpretations. It would be natural, then, that there are various versions of humanities relative to a tradition of how a human being has been understood. It is worthwhile to mention just three traditions. Since the East Asian tradition took the notion of gentleman(君子) as central to its anthropology it regarded Gyounghak(經學) as the core of humanities. Ancient Greece taught humanities to the sons of her citizens in accordance with her orientation of what the sense of the rights and duties of free members of a city should be. Later, the western Renaissance molded a notion of the human from the perspective that people need to be independent from much of the influence of the church and the application of that notion resulted in a new direction in the humanities.

The three traditions had different views on the conditions of human beings. To some, confusion-order could be the dominant human predicament. To others, it could be war-peace, famine-wealth, or oppression-freedom. But the contemporary communities in the global village, though they adhere to different heritages, have much more in common than they did in the past. Work and leisure, environment, information, sensuality and fitness are some of the issues which are of most concern to contemporary communities. It would be reasonable to make a conjecture to the effect that as history evolves, the human conditions which each epoch regarded as crucial, changes from those of survival toward those of realizing the human potential. In this respect, the history of the evolution of human conditions may be summed up as the evolution of humanization.

If the evolution of humanization could be any guide, it could suggest for us how to approach the disciplines of the humanities in this age of involved transformations. It is not clear to what extent the classical humanities expressed an interest in the modern social conditions. Some of the transformations we witnessed in the 20th century were profound. The human intellectual environment went through radical changes. Social sciences and natural sciences seem to double their activities every 10 years, not only enlarging the possibilities within their own fields but also maximizing their contributions to societies at large. But today many of us in the humanities, which are losing some of the attractiveness they enjoyed in the heyday of BIG theories, are busy specializing in particular topics. If we isolate ourselves as technicians in a specialized filed in the humanities, and don't concern ourselves with doing useful and effective research on qualitative conditions of life for people at large, it is only reasonable to expect that society will ask the empirical sciences to help enlighten their condition and receive quantified assesment of the present situation.

Reflections on the original purpose of the classical humanities will throw some light on the role the current humanities can play in the contemporary world. Although many other explanations will be possible, the purpose can be briefly sketched as follows.

(1) The Humanities are an attempt, by means of the verbal or non-verbal language to broaden the possibilities of human freedom limited by natural or social constraints.

Proposition (1) does not reflect a particular tradition in the classical humanities, rather it summarizes a common theme which exists therein. If the proposition is plausible, then the goal of the classical humanities may be said to be to broaden the possibilities of human freedom. Apparently, the dominant human concern in the classical humanities was the categories of oppression and freedom.

It is not the case that all the activities of the classical humanities were performed by a verbal language. Non-verbal experiments and activities in natural sciences, social sciences and various arts were deeply involved in broadening human freedom and they can be considered disciplines of the humanities in that regard. But if we were to choose a paradigmatic activity of the classical humanities it should be "reading classics". Reading and understanding the classics were one sufficient condition for being a participant in the humanities. In this sense, the classical humanities may be called "understanding oriented humanities(u_humanities)".

What can we say about a new direction for the humanities considering the changed notion of knowledge and the different conditions of the contemporary world? Let me propose the following if I may.

(2) The humanities are an attempt, by means of language activities, verbal or non-verbal, to express what it is to be human.

I would like to give a name to the humanities which satisfies the conditions of (2), "expression oriented humanities(e_humanities)". What distinguishes the two types of humanities? They each have their own separate sufficient conditions for being a practitioner in the field of humanities: to maximize human freedom and to realize human potential. U_humanities successfully fulfilled the goals which they had set out to do through a long struggle. E_humanities take freedom as a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. E_humanities admit that there are still many people who are oppressed in various parts of the world but insist that freedom is no longer the most urgent value for the global community. There are new values which the humanities should concentrate on promoting at the present time. The humanities need to set new and higher objectives now that the ideal of freedom has, to the present extent, been realized.

What is expression as a new value of the humanities? The word "expression" has been used notably in three different senses. Firstly, the word was widely taken to denote some presentation of what was emotionally felt whereas "proposition" designated some contents of the conditions for the truth of a sentence. There seems to be an obvious dichotomy between emotion and reason, which is not acceptable. Secondly, "Expression" was often used to refer to those various units of language like phrases or sentences. There is no objection to such a use, but I don't think that this is to be the primary sense of the word. The part of the meaning of the word I would like to emphasize is its third meaning focused on the performative character. "Expression" is sometimes used to refer to some elements of action by which one shows her or his agency character, as in "Mary expressed her approval by nodding."

This notion of expression needs to be defined more concisely. Since it is apparent that all people are constantly expressing something in one sense or another, I would allow that human expression is ubiquitous. But the notion of expression may be open to the idea of the degree of its manifestation, for some people are able to express more humanly and richly than others.

The idea that the notion of expression is of ubiquity and of degree suggests need of the formulation of some principles. Otherwise the notion may not be too useful. Then I may propose a principle, which is, that the realization of oneself is fitted with realization of all others(成己成物). This proposition is vague as it stands but it may be developed further to be useful. I would take this to allow a perspective from which one may connect any sort of human expressions, being able to evaluate any of them. This may be one of many principles which can regulate human expressions as a means of providing new directions for the humanities.3)

(III) The Humanities: Gap Between Universities and Cultural Realities

I argued that our notions of knowledge and the humanities have been or need to be, changed. But I happen to believe, on the one hand, that there is a gap between the humanities taught in universities and cultural realities and, on the other, that social sciences and natural sciences have come to have direct relevance to changes in social realities. It is only the humanities that have not come far enough. This may be because the humanities have had verbal language as their primary language, and thus perhaps they have limited their activities only to the space of verbal languages.

Let us consider the proposition (2), that is, that humanities are an attempt, by means of language activities, verbal or non-verbal, to express what it is to be human. The question is how we can express this. People find themselves, at any given moment, located in a system, and the system, once established over a period of time, tends to oppress its weaker members. The social sciences attempt to describe and understand such phenomena by methods of descriptive analyses and try to solve the problems they have identified. The humanities, nevertheless, try to approach the same phenomena by imagining what else there could be which would allow all people freedom and to help them realize their potentials. If the social sciences are mainly an actualist endeavor, then the humanities are mostly attempts to imagine the best possible space for human realization. The humanities made use of verbal languages for this purpose in "imagining" what would be possible and have been successful in performing various linear thought experiments and syntheses. That may explain why some scholars in the humanities were tempted to go into what's called BIG discourses.

But the contemporary cultural realities cannot be limited to the realm of verbal languages. There are many non-verbal languages which are asking to be heard. Such languages create a pluralistic, complex, and rich culture. For example, the digital media claims to be language in its own right. The media already plays the dominant role in inducing people to consume information. And it is heading toward the point where it will help not only businesses, but also individuals to produce information. The interactive digital culture opens the age where "everyone produces information". The digital age is characterized by the universal consumption and production of information. One can agree that the humanities, in the realm of contemporary culture, are thriving and successful, and may wish that the humanities in the academia would likewise thrive.(Picture 2)

(IV) Verbal Languages and Digital Languages in the Humanities

If the humanities could become pluralistic in their employment of languages, this would open up territories for new disciplines in the humanities. For example, if they could accept verbal languages and digital languages, these two types of languages would come to have distinct roles.

Digital languages would make it possible to fuse the various independent topics of the different disciplines in the humanities into a more unified theme. Movies by directors like Ingmar Bergman, Federico Fellini, Woody Allen, JehKyu Kang (Picture 3), and Akira Kurosawa exemplify one perennial question, that is, what it means to be a human. These movies blend various areas in the humanities to present the total context where a human being struggles to locate himself. The plasticity of reality realized by digital languages is very welcome in the face of the recent regimentation of many disciplines in the humanities in the name of specialization.

Digital languages could play another important role as well. That is, the role of connecting the academic humanities with cultural humanities. It would be hard to expect a verbal language to fulfill such a role. The contemporary popular culture is already distancing itself from the culture of written language. Universities can not leave the future status of the humanities to the mercy of the cultural markets. Academicians should pay close attention to the social realities around them and offer assessments of them. It seems to me that the best way for scholars to participate in the social milieu is to produce digital contents. Digitally produced academic works can speak more eloquently about the future of the digital culture than traditional language-based works.

I don't intend to suggest that verbal languages will be totally replaced by digital languages. Verbal languages have been employed in the humanities to fulfill their traditional functions. They are imagination, interpretation, analysis, criticism, synthesis, memory and so on. I do not believe that there is a more powerful language than verbal language for such tasks. No wonder our predecessors have insisted on the primacy of this written language and tried to improve its effectiveness.

The tradition of the primacy of verbal languages in the humanities should be kept up in the future. This needs to be emphasized in light of the fact that the tradition has been challenged from various sectors. Pluralization of languages should be accepted but not at the cost of sacrificing the primacy of verbal language. Particular topics and specializations in the humanities can not be ignored in the age of popular digital culture and they need to be protected in terms of the total humanities communities.

In conclusion, the humanities require a balanced perspective on the use of languages, namely, the primacy of verbal language on the one hand and the utilization of other types of languages on the other. The verbal language will deepen our understanding of the human predicament and the pluralization of languages is going to enrich the human existence. Then, it is time to consider how to set a new goal on a higher level for the humanities.4)

Daihyun Chung, The Changing Nature of Knowledge and New Directions for the Humanities,
International Symposium on New Directions for the Humanities, UNESCO_South Korea & Korean Philosophical Association, December 12-13, 2002.