Fitting: A Case of Cheng(誠) Intentionality

[I] Notions of fitting seem to be attractive in explaining language understanding. Fortunately some philosophers have discussed the notion of fitting. L. Wittgenstein used "fitting" in various ways. Perhaps the most important element in his idea of fitting may be the notion that fitting is prior to use. For an example, when we want to know the subject of a sentence we ask "who or what . .?" Wittgenstein suggests that the connection between the question and the subject as an answer is determined not by uses but fitting. N. Goodman declined an idea that fitting is a physical notion or a formal one. He opted for a view that fitting is a linguistic notion, which is working among components in a language. A. Goldman thinks that the world does not come to us as a precategorized whole. Though truth is non-epistemic he believes that we construct criterion of fitting so that we know, for an example, whether clothes we wear are fitting. Human epistemic endeavor starts in the world not yet conceptualized but ends in the world readily conceptualized. These three philosophers share something in common, I believe. Those notions of Wittgenstein's discovery, Goodman’s human invention and Goldman’s human conceptualization suggest a distinction between human-independent categories of the world and human-laden-categories. The distinction may suggest a dichotomy model of human-nature; intentional-nonintentional. They started to seek an alternative to the notion of truth but landed in the situation which can be explained only in terms of subject-object relation. This is something like physicalism which started as an alternative to Cartesian dualism but which realized that it took some variant of one conjunct of dualism. [II] If one can doubt whether the notion of fitting can work on the dichotomous model of intentionality then it may be natural to seek the notion on a different model. I propose that the notion of cheng(誠) may provide such a possibility. The notion of cheng is important in the Doctrine of the Mean1). "Cheng" literally means moderation, rectitude, propriety, equilibrium, sincerity, devotion. One may take a look at the root of the word. Cheng(誠) consists of two components, yan(言) and chheng(成). "Yan(言)"means language, metaphoric principle or objective, whereas "chheng(成)" connotes fulfillment, realization, or arrival. There have been many kinds of exegeses on cheng, but I would like to argue in a way to arrive at an interpretation of cheng(誠) which may better be understood as a notion of integration: What is “integration”? The first person point of view accepts the word to mean one's own bringing of elements of other systems together into one's own body or system. Then, what one may call an "integrator" is everywhere and all things in the world are integrators which process informations given by their surroundings. The Cartesian tradition used to call this integrator "mind" and limited the scope of its function to only humans, but the Confucian tradition calls "mind" any agent that does integrate. The difference between the two traditions is obvious. Cartesian school would argue that a human is a thinking being but other non-human things are not, whereas Confucian students entertain an organic view of the world, holding a thesis of continuity between humans and all other things. The continuity thesis is strengthened when evolution theory is presented as an option for the explanation of the origin of species. Suppose that the theory is taken as a hypothesis. Then, one is forced to accept not only the evolution of our bodies but also that of our minds. We come to land in a position to see that the human history is continuous with the histories of other entities. The wholesome results of the evolutionary processes in nature is such that survivors have become organically related with each other. When we come to see nature from this perspective, we can't help but perceive an eventual harmony in it, perhaps a cosmic harmony. The notion of cheng(誠) may be summed up as following: (1) The cheng(誠) of an entity is the power to realize the embedded objective of it in the context where it interacts with all others; (2) "Mind" refers to the ability of not a single kind of entities but to that of all entities of complex degrees in processing informations; (3) Cheng(誠) is a power of mind not only of humans but also of all other things; (4) If evolution reflects a history of species of what is better fit then history presents an evolution of life forms of what is flourishing and intelligent; (5) Cheng(誠) is realizing what can be the best in a given situation in which a subject is involved with its surroundings at the time.2) [III] Fitting may be a value by which one may explain phenomena, not only of humans but also of all non-humans. For the notion of fitting has various elements in it, both primitive and complex, narrow and wide. This claim needs some elaborations. How could a primitive community come to have its original language? Wouldn’t it be unreasonable to entertain that formations of primitive languages may be done by fittings of primitive expressions which came out of people's basic needs and desires in their concrete forms of life? Aren’t forms of life related to phenomena like obtaining food, shelter, clothing; recognizing others and being recognized by others; communicating with each other? Then, engaging in a form of life is a business not of one particular mode but of modes of totality; not of intelligence alone but of wholesome relations. Of course, we believe that we say what we presume to be true. But the notion of truth supposition in this belief does guarantee neither truth primitivism nor truth realism. Then the epistemic truth seems to be the alternative. But is it? If epistemic truth is some kind of construction of experiences would it take place mysteriously? If it requires some sort of basis what would that be? The notion of truth is not allowed to come in again. Then, what else? How do we say what we say? [IV] I tend to believe that the space where the notion of fitting works well is where humans identify an object and recognize a fact. How does one identify an object? If a is similar to b, then does this guarantee for us to know that they are identical? We know that similarity criterion for identification is not sufficient. Then many suggested a further condition, that is, "in some important respects." But it is granted that any formalization of the notion of "important respects" is not ready to be given. What does this situation suggest? Many philosophers are puzzled with this problem. It is reasonable to make conjectures that what's called "important respects" cannot be recognized apart from relevant contexts. In other words, this "important respects" can be understood not to refer to some relevant set of properties but to a relevant context where a particular perspective is paid attention. This perspective requires us to ask a question, whether it would be more fitting to identify two objects in the present context than not to; and also allows a basis to enable to answer the question. Most of ordinary identification questions would be answered at the first stage. But if the question is not answerable, the second stage will be introduced: whether two objects share properties which the context requires to have for the identification. The second question is distinct from the traditional question, that is, whether two sets of important properties in two objects are identical or similar. Questions of identification cannot be handled formally by any criteria of similarity of properties. They are rather to be approached contextually by asking which aspects of objects the given context requires to pay attention to. What is involved in our recognition of a fact? It is widely accepted that a fact depends on a language chosen, yet is constrained by the reality shared. But a context where a fact is recognized is not simple as it appears to be. What is a context? A context may not be believed to be given as it is. It is neither naturally given or nor a thing in itself. Rather a context is constituted out of a situation as a speaker and his hearers share not only informations but also various attitudes and interests.3) The same situation at time-place t1 may result as different contexts as different interests of people come in. Then, sharing an interest may take place at the end of numerous fitting ins and fitting outs of people involved. Through such a process a context may constitute a kind of life form or some quasi-grammar. -+ But the context does not dictate one single description. As to any context we are in, any number of descriptions are possible in relation to the context. Any description with which some sincerely try to fit in for the context is not out of place. Some of them are more or less fitting and others are more or less unfitting. It may take time for the community members to come to a more fitting description. But such a description is possible for it is they that constituted the context with the shared interests. Isn't it the case that one of those descriptions is true and others of them are false? Yes, it is, I think. But only if the community wants to keep up with the interest they started with and determined to keep it in the way they judge to be more fitting. That description will eventually come to be placed in a grammar for the community where it is classified as true and others as false. Notes 1) Confucius(孔子), Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean(論語 Lyunyu, 大學 Daxue, 中庸 Zhongyong), tr. James Legge, Dover1971(Clarendon,1893). 2) Daihyun Chung, "Intentionality of Cheng(誠): Toward an Organic View", Philosophy and Culture, Volume 2 Metaphysics, Korean Philosophical Association, To be published in 2008. 3) Stalnaker's notion of context as body of informations shared by discourse participants and Caplan's notion of it as collections of elements which enable to determine the content of an expression are much propositional, whereas Lewis' notion of context as that of scorekeeping including psychological ones is more holistic. One can argue in favor of the holistic view as what follows: "I am not in, leave a message" voiced by an answering machine may be propositional, but "I will not answer to the phone of the present number" voiced by the same machine expresses more than what is propositional. See: Robert C. Stalnaker, "On the Representation of Context", Context and Content, OxfordUniversityPress,1999(1998),pp.96-114; Ben Caplan, Putting Things in Contexts", Philosophical Review, April 2003: 191-214; Lewis, David, "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", Philosophical Papers, Oxford UniversityPress,1983(1979),pp.233-249.