A Conceptual Analysis of Suffering

Accept suffering and achieve atonement through it — that is what you must do. (Fyodor Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, 1866) 1. Opening: Suffering Relational and Redemptive There is a novel called "Please Look after Mom"1 by Kyung-Sook Shin. Shin portrays a mother who suffers many difficulties for the betterment of her children and toward the end of the novel, she juxtaposed images of the mother's suffering with images of Michelangelo's Pieta. The result seems to imply that all mothers in the human history suffered hardships for the sake of redemption of pains of their children. Then, I came to wonder why not to generalize the implication further. Thus arises my thesis of this paper that one's suffering is redemptive of others. There are some philosophers who are positive toward my thesis. For an example, Leibniz2 believed that suffering is good because it incites human will and says that sufferings are there not because God desired them to be there but because God allowed them. Scheler3 is more helpful for my claim. For he insists that all sufferings have meaning as sacrifice(Opfer). To him, all sufferings of members of a community are aimed as sacrifices for the well-beings of the whole of the community. An individual is said to suffer or die substitutionally for the sake of the whole. In this paper, I recognize that the notion of suffering has physical aspects as well as psychological ones, but I would like to make a further distinction in the psychology of suffering, that between the object and the meta levels. When one suffers it takes a form of an object in the sense that the experience of suffering has an aspect which is private. But as the experience-content of one's suffering is subject to scrutiny it will display meta characteristics since any mental language is social. I will pay attention in this paper to the meta aspect of suffering, assuming that the content of suffering at this level is social or relational and redemptive. In this sense, our mothers suffered many kinds of afflictions to relieve pains of their children. The notion of pain reflects one's bodily sensation or feeling but it also contains some mental content. Then, I will try to propose a relation between notions of suffering and pain in such a way that one suffers on behalf of reduction of pains in others, in order to give three arguments to advance my thesis. But before I go into the main arguments, I like to show how the subject of suffering is important. 2. Significance of Suffering: Why are there sufferings? A Buddhist tradition, that is, bodhisattva(菩薩) teaches that one does charity work to help others to be Buddhas before she herself become a Buddha. Christianity placed Jesus's crucifixion in the center of the history of salvation, thereby interpreting the notion of suffering extensively and teaching that one accepts suffering in order to lessen other's pains. But Nietzsche4 thinks that happiness is not a criterion for being a higher person, allowing that free spirits will be cheerful or gay. Instead he observes that suffering makes us more profound, necessary for the cultivation of human excellence though suffering is not intrinsically valuable. I tend to think that religious views of suffering is wholistic and communal whereas Nietzsche's view is individualistic and private. If I have to support the thesis of redemptive suffering, there should be a way to avoid the Nietzschean view of suffering. People seek for happiness. But when they undergo pains, priorities become obvious. Elimination of pain come ahead of achievement of happiness. This seems to suggest the primitiveness of pain. The implication of the primitiveness of pain is important. We are open to construct theories of human values or ethics, but all of them should satisfy a condition that pains are primitive and basic. Any theory can not afford to ignore the basic condition. Then, in spite of the situation that there is pluralistic theories of values, they share a basic value, which is the primitiveness of pains. But why should I accept the thesis of priority of the pain elimination over the happiness pursuit? One can find a positive support in the philosophy of science, where falsifiability is dominant over to verifiability. For it says that truth of a proposition can not be ascertained here and now, but its falsity can. The falsificationism can also be applied to the social phenomena. It would seem to be impossible to reach a consensus as to what should be the condition for happiness for all people in a nation, but it would not be difficult for a nation to come to an agreement as to what should be the priority of values one of which is elimination of pains. Confucius's notion of seo(恕)5 may help to see the priority thesis. The notion literally means forgiveness, but Confucius himself clarifies what he means by the notion of seo, saying that one does not do to others what she does not want to be done to herself(己所不欲勿施於人). This is one way of expressing the golden rule. But why did Confucius say the golden rule in a difficult mode of double negation? Some scholars interpreted Confucius's expression as saying the one and same golden rule. But I don't think that Confucius would agree with the interpretation. He should have a reason to say the Golden rule in the sophisticated manner. What's called the "positive" golden rule(Treat others in the way you want to be treated) has the appearance of equal exchange treatment, not indicating any interest in other's person or in any human solidarity. But Confucius's "negative" golden rule shows a deep interest in other's personhood, in taking other as the same human as he. Confucius seems to take the human solidarity as consisting of the priority of the pain elimination over the happiness pursuit. The primitiveness of pain may be the basis from which we reach some sort of objectivity or connectivity among theories of morality in the age of pluralism. Then the fact that humans share pain as one primitive notion allows "the" Archimedean point" where human ethical discourses may maintain some objective structure. Now I can afford to give one answer to Nietzschean view of suffering. My answer is to be found in the role which the notion of pain plays among various ethical theories to allow them a semantical basis for an inter-theoretic dialogue. 3. An Idea of Conservat ion: The conservation law of mass says that mass in a closed system is neither created nor destroyed though it may be differently rearranged. Bongho Sohn applied the conservation law of the physical world to the experience of suffering of the social world, calling it "the conservation law of suffering"6: (S1) My unjust interest(pleasure) costs pains in others to the level of the same amount, but if I voluntarily suffer a sacrifice others will have their pains lightened to the analogous level. Of course, there are huge disanalogies between the conservation law of mass and the conservation law of suffering, which are recognized among the natural phenomena and the social phenomena. Disanalogies between the two can be seen under the subjects like extension, truth-functionality, projectibility, intension, and the like. But what we can get from the comparison of the two law statements is greater than the difficulties we may undergo due to the disanalogies of the two. What do we gain from the analogies of the two? Suppose that we accept the conservation law of suffering. Then, we can lessen pains of others as much as we willingly accept our sacrifices on our part. Our sufferings can be redemptive of pains of others. Of course, this suffering is the one to be defined by the law statement of suffering. The conservation law of suffering may be found working in various fields of the human experience. I would like to pay attention to some of them. Currency is one of our interesting examples. The total amount of money currency is fixed at any given time. But opportunities for the access to the currency are not equally distributed among members of the society. The strong persons enjoy more or bigger opportunities in the society but the weak ones have fewer or less opportunities. Then, the strong ones in our society need to be reminded of the conservation statement. Ecology is another subject for our reflection. Vegetarianism writes that if there is an alternative means one needs to avoid unnecessary suffering to animals. What would be the basis for such a belief? There are a few views on it. Singer7 holds that there is continuity between humans and animals so far as these animals display abilities of feeling pleasure and pain enough so that they are the object of human moral consideration. Naess 8insists that any life itself is significant so that I am more than my body and my mind, in order to deserve to be Self in the capital S which includes everything. Taylor9 entertains an idea that everything, conscious or not conscious, constitutes a system which moves teleologically so as to preserve its own self and well-being. Sok-Hon Ham is very metaphysical in formulating his philosophical world view. Ssial(種子)10, literally translated as "seeds", are spirits which reside in matter, are infinites which live in finites, are eternity which are contained in things of temporality. Ham applies vitalaity of life to things in the organic world as well as in the inorganic world and subsumed all of them under a concept which he called "oneness". And Ham goes further to say that these ssial are subjects of life and meaning which are united with the history through their participations of others's pains. As one can allow what some ecologist interests claim, that is, that humans and natures are continuous, it becomes clearer that my avarice means pains in others. Another case of the conservation law of suffering is obtained in a report which writes "other's pain is a medicine for my pain". It implies that whenever I witness others in deep pain I feel my pain relieved. This medicine case does neither look rational nor moral, at least on its surface.11 But the medicine case may be redescribed as following: I feel my suffering lessened whenever I witness that though others did not intend, they consequently or de facto participated in my suffering through their sufferings. If we can accept this redescription, we can locate the locus where the consolation takes place. It seems to be where a shift is made from the solitude of suffering to the solidarity of shared suffering. One may deny the plausibility of the redescription. But if there is a reason for the denial I wonder what it would be. But until the reason for the denial is coming forward then the case of the redescription is acceptable. And one remembers that people often console their friends under suffering by telling them stories of how others undergo deeper sufferings. I believe that these stories are legitimate and efficient way to lessen sufferings of them. The medicine case appears to be not consistent with the conservation law of suffering, strictly speaking. For the medicine case does not satisfy the voluntary condition which the law statement mentions. Then, what we came up with in the discussions above seem to allow to extend the voluntary condition further and to generalize it as following: (S2) My unjust interest(pleasure) costs pains in others to the level of the same amount, but in connection with pains of others if I voluntarily or otherwise suffer a sacrifice others will consequently have their pains diminished to the analogous level. The phrase "in connection with pains of others" need a clarification. If there is no phrase like this in the condition, the relation between the acceptance of suffering and the elimination of pains remain open and not concrete. Then, a question is valid, that is, whether any kind of acceptance of suffering can lessen any other varieties of pains. Then, these two needs to be connected and the two are related by causation or rememberance of the two events under consideration. 4. Considerat ion from a Yin-Yang Perspective: The thesis of redemptive suffering can be supported by a conception of yin-yang. The notion of yin-yang looks to be an alternative world view, as theories of dualism or of physicalism appear more and more weakening.12 For an example, these are not capable of explaining a notion like "bodies as mind-realizers". For they don't believe that two different substances can maintain a relationship of realization of one by the other. But the notion of yin-yang has maintained that any event or any thing consists of yin-yang, two complementary opposites that interact within a greater whole, as part of a dynamic system. "Yin-Yang"(陰陽) literally means shadowed-lighted and their logic works organically not only within a thing internally but also in a thing externally with its environment. The notion of yinyang also interprets mind and body in human beings not as two opposite dualities but as two capacities which interact with each other.13 This logic of the notion can be extended to the realm of the social phenomena, taking any relation among members of a society as a unit of the wholistic integration of the greater total organism. Then, it is inviting to say from this perspective that one's suffering is redemptive of pains of others. Democracy may be a subject which can be analyzed from a view of yin-yang.14 Democracy is understood as people's governing through the process of voting. People's governing may be direct or representational but the people's decision for a consensus is made by the majority rule. The decision may be reached by a process of people's preferences or of people's deliberate consideration. But there is no other way to reach the decision except through the majority rule. Then, democracy is a system which always left the minority behind by the majority rule. There are cases of unanimity but they are exceptional than a rule. Then, when a community makes a decision, democracy demands its members that the majority leads and the minority follows. Any consensus is bound to contain a room of exclusion. It would be useful to read exactly what is at work in the logic of majority's leading and minority's following upon any democratic decision. Elitistic philosophy of politics like Plato's criticized democratic processes as populistic. For the relation of leading and following will eventually lead to moments like a distancing between consensus and exclusion, a conflict of interests. But there is a way to read the same democratic processes in terms of yin-yang. The majority rule of democracy does not require that the fate of a community is decided by the one and only one event of voting. It rather consists of a series of voting as to institutional establishments, officers appointments, policies revisions, hearings and so on. And members of the community are to be informed and conscientized voters as they are open to all the necessary informations and to opportunities of discussions of the relevant topics and view points. Then it is important to note that just as yin-yang are not two separate substances but ever-exchanging flexible powers any events in the democratic processes are also everexchanging capacities to interact with each other. Democracy has been opted for not because it is a perfect system of people's governing at a given time but because it is the only available system which people can depend on. Then, the relation of leading and following reflects integrated capacities of all kinds in their organic wholesomeness. If the yin-yang interpretation of democracy is plausible, the following statement is what I would recommend. (S3) My acceptance of suffering and the decrease of other's pain are two complementary aspects of one reality. 5. A Conception of Responsibility: The thesis of the redemptive suffering can be read in the conception of responsibility. Responsibility is one of the major properties of the human action. If a human act is significantly meaningful, a society asks the agent of the act for its responsibility. The agent is rewarded if the act is positively meaningful, but he is punished if the act violates some communal criteria. "Pain" is derived from a latin word, "poena", which means punishment.15 The etymological relation between pain and punishment may be a basis from which a common sense is derived, namely, that anyone who gave a human some pains should take some equivalent pains back. But this common sense can be redescribed a Kantian perspective: Anyone who gave a human some pain damaged his own person and then he needed to restore his person in the rightful state back by being suffered(punished). If we can accept such an interpretation of punishment, we can reach the conception of the redemptive suffering that "being responsible" means "relieving pains by accepting sufferings". We may go further to pay attention to the notion of responsibility on the social dimension. Crimes are committed mostly by individuals. But it is also said that these individual crimes are expenses which the society should pay for the sake of changing institutions and policies in order to improve the society. Then, the so-called "criminals" are nothing more or nothing less than agents who are constructed in the course of paying the expenses. We already observed that it would be difficult to separate the predicament of individuals from the realm of the society in the strict sense as the conservation law of suffering and the yin-yan thesis suggest. And one is apt to accept a Kantian interpretation16 that the meaning of punishment for the offence of an individual is the restoration of his person to the state before his offence. Then, the payments for the expense due to crimes on the part of the society may be taken as a part of processes where the society is integrated to a wholesome stage. One characteristic of the notion of responsibility needs to be clarified in the context of supporting the redemptive character of suffering. During the primitive ages of the human history, east or west, there had been sacrificial rituals in order to redeem the wrongs committed by an individual or a communal entity. They burned a pigeon, sheep, cow, or even a human, in believing that their offences can be substitutionally forgiven. They must have known that there was no conceptual connection between their own offences on the one hand and the living body itself which is offered as a sacrifice on the other. They just assumed that the deity would grant the relation between the offender and the offering which is forced to assume the other's responsibility. Still, we have a trace of this past superstition in a popular use of the word "scape goat". Fortunately, our contemporary notion of responsibility is agent-centered and voluntary-based. Then, the following statement seems to be attractive. (S4) The relation of crimes and punishments is ingtegrational at the level of an individual concerned, the relation of one's acceptance of suffering and lessening of other's pains is integrational at the level of community. 6. Concluding-Capitalism and Conservationism: Capitalism is not something we can avoid in the present world. But the notions of capacity and competition in capitalism need to be constrained. The shadow of the polarization between the Haves and the Have-nots is deteriorated worse and worse. The world is no longer a world where an individual can be happy with his own happiness alone. The world is a world in which human beings live together with each other. The notion of suffering is worthy of considering as primitive for the world we live in. This redemptive suffering is a value by which one can recognize the human solidarity, with which capitalism can be revised, which can give substance to the way how democracy works. It is one of the basic conceptions where the market can be humane and democracy may be concretely embodied. Then, my treatments of statements (S1) through (S4) may lead to a conclusion, which I would like to call "conservationism of suffering", that is: (S5) The relation between one's acceptance of suffering and the reduction of pains in others reflects a redemptive property of the world where all human beings live together. --notes-- 1 Kyung-Sook Shin, Please Look after Mom, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011. 2 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Peter Remnant, Jonathan Francis Bennett (1996). New Essays on Human Understanding. Cambridge University Press. pp. 182-190. 3 Max Scheler, "The Meaning of Suffering." Tr. Harold J. Bershady. In Max Scheler. On Feeling Knowing, and Valuing. Selected Writings. Ed. with an Introduction by Harold J. Bershady. The University of Chicago Press, 1992. http://www.SchelerSociety.US 4 F. Niezsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1966: 225, 270; The Gay Science, trans. W. Kaufmann, New York: Vintage, 1974: 3. 5 Confucius(孔子: BC 552∼BC 479), The analects of Confucius(論語, Lún Yǔ), translated with an introduction by Roger T. Ames, Henry Rosemont, Jr., New York : Ballantine Books, 1999. 6 Bong-Ho Sohn, "Victim-centered Ethics", Sogang Humanities Nonchong, Sogang University, Seoul, Volume 11(2000): 5-26, 25(in Korean); Bong-Ho Sohn, Human Being in Pain, Seoul National University Press, 1995(in Korean). This book is resourceful in insights and informations, to which I am indebted for (S1) and others. 7 Peter Singer, "A Utilitarian Defence of Animal Liberation", in Environmental Ethics, ed. Louis Pojman, Stamford, CT: Wadsworth, 2001: 35. 8 A. Naess, Ecology, Community, Lifestyle, trans. and ed. D. Rothenberg, Cambridge University Press, 1989. 9 Paul Taylor, "The Ethics of Respect for Nature", Michael E. Zimmerman, ed., Environmental Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1993: 74. 10 Sok-Hon Ham, Ham Sok-Hon's Comlete Works, Seoul: Hangilsa, 1993: Volume 14, pp. 323-357(in Korean). 11 Dennis L. Apple, Life After the Death of My Son, Beacon Hill Press, 2008. 12 David J. Chalmers, The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory, New York : Oxford University Press, 1996. 13 Daihyun Chung, “Intentionality of Cheng(誠): Toward an Organic View”, Philosophy and Culture: Metaphysics, Korean Philosophical Association, 2008: 33-40. 14 Moomok Yang, "Yin-Yang as Redeemer and Democracy", Dsesoon Thought Nonchong, Daejin University, South Korea, Volume 2(1996): 153-239(in Korean). Mr. Yang gives a list of human dignity, freedom, equality and social justice, as democratic concepts which are illuminated by yin-yang logic, 212-214. 15 Merriam Webster: Pain- from Anglo-French peine, from Latin poena, from Greek poin payment, penalty; akin to ē Greek tinein to pay, tinesthai to punish, Avestan kaēnā revenge, Sanskrit cayate he revenges 16 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice, translated by John Ladd, 2nd Edition, Hackett Publishing, 1999, p. 139: "But what is meant by the statement, 'If you steal from him, you steal from yourself?' Inasmuch as someone steals, he makes the property of everyone else insecure, and hence he robs of himself of the security of any possible property."

Fitting: A Case of Cheng(誠) Intentionality

[I] Notions of fitting seem to be attractive in explaining language understanding. Fortunately some philosophers have discussed the notion of fitting. L. Wittgenstein used "fitting" in various ways. Perhaps the most important element in his idea of fitting may be the notion that fitting is prior to use. For an example, when we want to know the subject of a sentence we ask "who or what . .?" Wittgenstein suggests that the connection between the question and the subject as an answer is determined not by uses but fitting. N. Goodman declined an idea that fitting is a physical notion or a formal one. He opted for a view that fitting is a linguistic notion, which is working among components in a language. A. Goldman thinks that the world does not come to us as a precategorized whole. Though truth is non-epistemic he believes that we construct criterion of fitting so that we know, for an example, whether clothes we wear are fitting. Human epistemic endeavor starts in the world not yet conceptualized but ends in the world readily conceptualized. These three philosophers share something in common, I believe. Those notions of Wittgenstein's discovery, Goodman’s human invention and Goldman’s human conceptualization suggest a distinction between human-independent categories of the world and human-laden-categories. The distinction may suggest a dichotomy model of human-nature; intentional-nonintentional. They started to seek an alternative to the notion of truth but landed in the situation which can be explained only in terms of subject-object relation. This is something like physicalism which started as an alternative to Cartesian dualism but which realized that it took some variant of one conjunct of dualism. [II] If one can doubt whether the notion of fitting can work on the dichotomous model of intentionality then it may be natural to seek the notion on a different model. I propose that the notion of cheng(誠) may provide such a possibility. The notion of cheng is important in the Doctrine of the Mean1). "Cheng" literally means moderation, rectitude, propriety, equilibrium, sincerity, devotion. One may take a look at the root of the word. Cheng(誠) consists of two components, yan(言) and chheng(成). "Yan(言)"means language, metaphoric principle or objective, whereas "chheng(成)" connotes fulfillment, realization, or arrival. There have been many kinds of exegeses on cheng, but I would like to argue in a way to arrive at an interpretation of cheng(誠) which may better be understood as a notion of integration: What is “integration”? The first person point of view accepts the word to mean one's own bringing of elements of other systems together into one's own body or system. Then, what one may call an "integrator" is everywhere and all things in the world are integrators which process informations given by their surroundings. The Cartesian tradition used to call this integrator "mind" and limited the scope of its function to only humans, but the Confucian tradition calls "mind" any agent that does integrate. The difference between the two traditions is obvious. Cartesian school would argue that a human is a thinking being but other non-human things are not, whereas Confucian students entertain an organic view of the world, holding a thesis of continuity between humans and all other things. The continuity thesis is strengthened when evolution theory is presented as an option for the explanation of the origin of species. Suppose that the theory is taken as a hypothesis. Then, one is forced to accept not only the evolution of our bodies but also that of our minds. We come to land in a position to see that the human history is continuous with the histories of other entities. The wholesome results of the evolutionary processes in nature is such that survivors have become organically related with each other. When we come to see nature from this perspective, we can't help but perceive an eventual harmony in it, perhaps a cosmic harmony. The notion of cheng(誠) may be summed up as following: (1) The cheng(誠) of an entity is the power to realize the embedded objective of it in the context where it interacts with all others; (2) "Mind" refers to the ability of not a single kind of entities but to that of all entities of complex degrees in processing informations; (3) Cheng(誠) is a power of mind not only of humans but also of all other things; (4) If evolution reflects a history of species of what is better fit then history presents an evolution of life forms of what is flourishing and intelligent; (5) Cheng(誠) is realizing what can be the best in a given situation in which a subject is involved with its surroundings at the time.2) [III] Fitting may be a value by which one may explain phenomena, not only of humans but also of all non-humans. For the notion of fitting has various elements in it, both primitive and complex, narrow and wide. This claim needs some elaborations. How could a primitive community come to have its original language? Wouldn’t it be unreasonable to entertain that formations of primitive languages may be done by fittings of primitive expressions which came out of people's basic needs and desires in their concrete forms of life? Aren’t forms of life related to phenomena like obtaining food, shelter, clothing; recognizing others and being recognized by others; communicating with each other? Then, engaging in a form of life is a business not of one particular mode but of modes of totality; not of intelligence alone but of wholesome relations. Of course, we believe that we say what we presume to be true. But the notion of truth supposition in this belief does guarantee neither truth primitivism nor truth realism. Then the epistemic truth seems to be the alternative. But is it? If epistemic truth is some kind of construction of experiences would it take place mysteriously? If it requires some sort of basis what would that be? The notion of truth is not allowed to come in again. Then, what else? How do we say what we say? [IV] I tend to believe that the space where the notion of fitting works well is where humans identify an object and recognize a fact. How does one identify an object? If a is similar to b, then does this guarantee for us to know that they are identical? We know that similarity criterion for identification is not sufficient. Then many suggested a further condition, that is, "in some important respects." But it is granted that any formalization of the notion of "important respects" is not ready to be given. What does this situation suggest? Many philosophers are puzzled with this problem. It is reasonable to make conjectures that what's called "important respects" cannot be recognized apart from relevant contexts. In other words, this "important respects" can be understood not to refer to some relevant set of properties but to a relevant context where a particular perspective is paid attention. This perspective requires us to ask a question, whether it would be more fitting to identify two objects in the present context than not to; and also allows a basis to enable to answer the question. Most of ordinary identification questions would be answered at the first stage. But if the question is not answerable, the second stage will be introduced: whether two objects share properties which the context requires to have for the identification. The second question is distinct from the traditional question, that is, whether two sets of important properties in two objects are identical or similar. Questions of identification cannot be handled formally by any criteria of similarity of properties. They are rather to be approached contextually by asking which aspects of objects the given context requires to pay attention to. What is involved in our recognition of a fact? It is widely accepted that a fact depends on a language chosen, yet is constrained by the reality shared. But a context where a fact is recognized is not simple as it appears to be. What is a context? A context may not be believed to be given as it is. It is neither naturally given or nor a thing in itself. Rather a context is constituted out of a situation as a speaker and his hearers share not only informations but also various attitudes and interests.3) The same situation at time-place t1 may result as different contexts as different interests of people come in. Then, sharing an interest may take place at the end of numerous fitting ins and fitting outs of people involved. Through such a process a context may constitute a kind of life form or some quasi-grammar. -+ But the context does not dictate one single description. As to any context we are in, any number of descriptions are possible in relation to the context. Any description with which some sincerely try to fit in for the context is not out of place. Some of them are more or less fitting and others are more or less unfitting. It may take time for the community members to come to a more fitting description. But such a description is possible for it is they that constituted the context with the shared interests. Isn't it the case that one of those descriptions is true and others of them are false? Yes, it is, I think. But only if the community wants to keep up with the interest they started with and determined to keep it in the way they judge to be more fitting. That description will eventually come to be placed in a grammar for the community where it is classified as true and others as false. Notes 1) Confucius(孔子), Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine of the Mean(論語 Lyunyu, 大學 Daxue, 中庸 Zhongyong), tr. James Legge, Dover1971(Clarendon,1893). 2) Daihyun Chung, "Intentionality of Cheng(誠): Toward an Organic View", Philosophy and Culture, Volume 2 Metaphysics, Korean Philosophical Association, To be published in 2008. 3) Stalnaker's notion of context as body of informations shared by discourse participants and Caplan's notion of it as collections of elements which enable to determine the content of an expression are much propositional, whereas Lewis' notion of context as that of scorekeeping including psychological ones is more holistic. One can argue in favor of the holistic view as what follows: "I am not in, leave a message" voiced by an answering machine may be propositional, but "I will not answer to the phone of the present number" voiced by the same machine expresses more than what is propositional. See: Robert C. Stalnaker, "On the Representation of Context", Context and Content, OxfordUniversityPress,1999(1998),pp.96-114; Ben Caplan, Putting Things in Contexts", Philosophical Review, April 2003: 191-214; Lewis, David, "Scorekeeping in a Language Game", Philosophical Papers, Oxford UniversityPress,1983(1979),pp.233-249.